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IAN MANNERS*
Creative efforts: the normative power of the European Union
World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate 
to the dangers which threaten it.
Robert Schuman, declaration of 9 May 1950, Paris
The creative efforts of the European integration process have changed what passes 
for ‘normal’ in world politics. Simply by existing as different in a world of states 
and the relations between them, the European Union changes the normality of 
‘international relations’. In this respect the EU is a normative power: it changes 
the norms, standards and prescriptions of world politics away from the bounded 
expectations of state-centricity. However, it is one thing to say that the EU is a 
normative power by virtue of its hybrid polity consisting of supranational and 
international forms of governance; it is another to argue that the EU acts in a 
normative (i.e. ethically good) way. The focus of this article will be on the ways in 
which we might judge the normative ethics of the EU in world politics by criti-
cally discussing the principles that it seeks to promote, the practices through which 
it promotes them, and the impact they have.1
The EU has been, is and always will be a normative power in world politics. 
This is a strong claim with a critical aim: to promote normative approaches to 
the study of the EU in world politics. This aim is built on the acknowledgement 
in critical theory that ‘theory is always for someone and for some purpose’, since 
‘theory constitutes as well as explains the questions it asks (and those it does not 
ask)’.2 There is a simple temptation to attempt to analyse EU policy and influence 
in world politics empirically without ever asking why the EU is or is not acting, 
or how we might best judge what the EU should be doing in world politics. A 
* I am very grateful to Lisbeth Aggestam, Annika Bergman-Rosamond, Elizabeth Burdett, David Chandler, 
Chris Hill, Mary Martin, Hartmut Mayer and Mark Webber for their helpful comments.
1 My focus of analysis is a holistic approach to the EU in world politics, including the international dimensions 
of internal policies, enlargement and external actions, rather than an exclusive focus on the EU’s ‘weakest link’, 
the CFSP/CSDP.
2 Robert Cox, ‘Social forces, states and world order: beyond international relations theory’, Millennium 10: 2, 
1981, p. 128; Catharine Hoskyns, ‘Gender perspectives’, in Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez, eds, European inte-
gration theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 224; Ian Manners, ‘Critical perspectives on European 
Union politics’, in Knud Erik Jørgensen, Mark Pollack and Ben Rosamond, eds, Handbook of European Union 
politics (London: Sage, 2007), p. 78.
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normative power approach rejects such temptations to unreflective and uncritical 
analysis. Instead it aims to contribute to a better understanding of what principles 
the EU promotes, how the EU acts, and what impact the EU has by attempting 
both to analyse and to judge the EU’s normative power in world politics.
The idea that a political union could be both normative and powerful at the 
same time may strike many as a contradiction in terms, if one reads normative 
power as a primarily self-empowering exercise. Over the past eight years I have 
attempted to develop an argument that normative power in general, and the EU’s 
normative power in particular, is sustainable only if it is felt to be legitimate by 
those who practise and experience it.3 At the same time, a number of scholars have 
explored the EU’s ethical dimension in foreign policy; but I consider it important 
to use the term ‘normative power’ to describe the EU’s principles, actions and 
impact in world politics, rather than to conflate this with the idea of an ethical 
foreign policy.4
In arguing that the EU is a normative power in world politics, I mean that the 
EU promotes a series of normative principles that are generally acknowledged, 
within the United Nations system, to be universally applicable. As discussed in 
the next section, the nine substantive normative principles which both constitute, 
and are promoted by, the EU are sustainable peace, freedom, democracy, human 
rights, rule of law, equality, social solidarity, sustainable development and good 
governance.5 But in propounding the normative power of the EU in this article, I 
shall also focus on the way in which the EU promotes such substantive principles 
by virtue of the principles of ‘living by example’; by duty of its actions in ‘being 
reasonable’; and by consequence of its impact in ‘doing least harm’. As discussed 
in the third section, these three procedural normative ethics help us make sense of, 
and judge, the way in which normative power is exercised.6
3 Ian Manners, ‘Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 
working paper 38, 2000; Ian Manners, ‘Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’, Journal of Common 
Market Studies 40: 2, 2002, pp. 235–58; Ian Manners, ‘The constitutive nature of values, images and principles 
in the European Union’, in Sonia Lucarelli and Ian Manners, eds, Values and principles in European Union foreign 
policy (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 19–41; Ian Manners, ‘Normative power Europe reconsidered: beyond 
the crossroads’, Journal of European Public Policy 13: 2, 2006, pp. 182–99; Ian Manners, ‘The European Union as a 
normative power: a response to Thomas Diez’, Millennium 35: 1, 2006, pp. 167–80; Ian Manners, ‘The symbolic 
manifestation of the European Union’s normative role in world politics’, in Ole Elgström and Michael Smith, 
eds, New roles for the European Union in international politics (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 66–84; Ian Manners, 
‘European Union “normative power” and the security challenge’, European Security 15: 4, 2006, pp. 405–21; 
Ian Manners, ‘European Union, normative power and ethical foreign policy’, in David Chandler and Volker 
Heins, eds, Rethinking ethical foreign policy: pitfalls, possibilities and paradoxes (London: Routledge, 2006), pp.  116–36; 
Ian Manners, ‘L’identité internationale de l’Union européenne: un pouvoir normatif dans le jeu politique 
mondial’, in Bernard Adam, ed., Europe, puissance tranquille? Rôle et identité sur la scène mondiale  (Brussels: Editions 
Complexe, 2007), pp. 33–49; Ian Manners and Richard Whitman, ‘The “difference engine”: constructing and 
representing the international identity of the European Union’, Journal of European Public Policy 10: 3, 2003, pp. 
380–404; Ian Manners and Sonia Lucarelli, ‘Conclusion: valuing principles in European Union foreign policy’, 
in Lucarelli and Manners, Values and principles, pp. 201–15; Ian Manners and Thomas Diez, ‘Reflecting on 
normative power Europe’, in Felix Berenskoetter and Michael J. Williams, eds, Power in world politics (London: 
Routledge, 2007), pp. 173–88.
4 See discussion in Manners, ‘Normative power and ethical foreign policy’, pp. 116–17.
5 Manners, ‘Normative power Europe’ (COPRI); Manners, ‘Normative power Europe’ (JCMS); Manners, ‘The 
constitutive nature’. 
6 Ian Manners, ‘Normative power Europe: a transdisciplinary approach to European studies’, in Chris Rumford, 
ed., Handbook of European studies (London: Sage, 2008).
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The ethics of the EU’s normative power are located in the ability to normalize 
a more just, cosmopolitical world. Catarina Kinnvall and Paul Nesbitt-Larking 
argue, drawing on Cheah and Robbins, Archibugi and Calhoun, that ‘cosmo politics 
is about empowering people in the actual conditions of their lives’.7 Attempting to 
normalize a more just, cosmopolitical world ‘can thus be seen as an approach trying 
to combine communitarianism with cosmopolitanism … Traditional cosmo-
politanism … relies on a discourse of individual rights; while communitarianism is 
based on a discourse of social rights which is often expressed in exclusive localism. 
Both run the risk of substituting ethics for politics.’8 As Pascal Lamy has put it, 
‘the notion of cosmopolitics describes a new world that is coming into being … 
More generally, cosmopolitics may simply be about thinking globally and acting 
locally.’9 Thus a more just, cosmopolitical world would be one in which commu-
nitarian, social rights of the self accommodate cosmopolitan, individual rights of 
others; where local politics and global politics commune.
The rest of this article will explore both the EU’s substantive normative  principles 
and its procedural normative ethics. The article will first look at the nine substan-
tive normative principles promoted by the EU. It will then use an original tripar-
tite analytical method in order to suggest how to judge the EU’s  principles, actions 
and impact by using three major approaches to procedural normative ethics: virtue 
ethics, deontological ethics and consequentialist ethics.10 Finally, it will conclude 
by arguing that we must judge the EU’s creative efforts to promote a more just, 
cosmopolitical world in terms of its principles, actions and impact. These three 
approaches provide the EU with maxims which should shape the EU’s normative 
power in world politics: live by example; be reasonable; and do least harm.
Substantive normative principles
The Union’s objectives
In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values 
and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, 
security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among 
peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in 
particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of 
international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.11
7 Catarina Kinnvall and Paul Nesbitt-Larking, The political psychology of globalisation: Muslims in the West (forth-
coming). See also Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins, eds, Cosmopolitics: thinking and feeling beyond the nation 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); Craig Calhoun, ‘The class consciousness of frequent 
travellers: towards a critique of actually existing cosmopolitanism’, in Daniele Archibugi, ed., Debating cosmo-
politics (London: Verso, 2003), pp. 86–116.
8 Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking, Political psychology of globalisation.
9 Pascal Lamy, ‘Europe and the future of economic governance’, Journal of Common Market Studies 42: 1, 2004, pp. 
13 and 20; Manners, ‘The constitutive nature’, p. 28.
10 See Manners, ‘Normative power Europe’ (JCMS), p. 252 for the origins of this tripartite analytical method 
based on comparing and contrasting what the EU ‘is’ (its aims and principles); what the EU ‘says’ (its policies 
and actions); and what the EU ‘does’ (its outcomes and impact). See also the discussion of the constitution/
institutionalization, performance and impact of the EU’s normative role in world politics in Manners, ‘The 
symbolic manifestation’, pp. 69–81.
11 Article 3–5, Reform Treaty 2007.
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General provisions on the Union’s external action
The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have 
inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in 
the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and 
solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international 
law.12
Articles 3-5 and 10-1 of the Reform Treaty (amending the Treaty on European 
Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community) illustrate the values 
and principles the EU seeks to promote in the wider world.13 In addition to these 
two articles the preamble and the statement of the Union’s values (article 2), along-
side the recognition of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (article 6-1), suggest 
that a series of principles can be identified which shape what the EU is and should 
be promoting in world politics. From a cynical viewpoint it might be suggested 
that such treaty articles and the policies they drive are at best unimportant, or 
at worst provide cover for more covert commercial interests. In contrast I argue 
that the constitutionalization of these normative principles in the highly contested 
Lisbon Reform Treaty marks the crystallization and culmination of norms and 
practices which have been evolving over the past 15 years.
In the rest of this section I shall discuss the nine normative principles which 
are substantiated in EU law and policies, and which it seeks to promote in world 
politics. I shall discuss all nine principles with brief references to the Reform Treaty 
as a means of marking the extent to which such norms have been given concrete 
form in the face of Eurosceptical opposition. In this respect the nine normative 
principles are those which EU member states, institutions and citizens are willing 
to stand up for, or at least not knock down. Thus, the Reform Treaty marks the 
most recent stage in a process that is constitutive of the EU’s normative power in 
world politics, regardless of its ratification.
Sustainable peace
The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples.14
The prime EU normative principle of sustainable peace addresses the roots or causes 
of conflict, mirroring the European experience of ensuring that war ‘becomes 
not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible’. The EU policy emphasis is 
placed on development aid, trade, interregional cooperation, political dialogue 
and enlargement as elements of a more holistic approach to conflict prevention. 
12 Article 10–1, Reform Treaty 2007.
13 I use the term ‘Reform Treaty’ to refer to the Lisbon Treaty Amending the Treaty on European Union and 
the Treaty Establishing the European Community, even when no amendment takes place. I use the term 
‘Functioning Treaty’ to refer to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union which replaces the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community. All treaty articles refer to the Reform Treaty unless stated 
otherwise.
14 Article 3–1, Reform Treaty 2007.
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However, the EU’s growing civilian and military operational capacities also have 
a sustainable peace mission with a focus on ‘peace-keeping, conflict prevention 
and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the 
United Nations Charter’.15
As the extract from the Reform Treaty illustrates, the first objective of the Union 
is to promote peace (article 3-1). But the rest of the treaty suggests that such an objec-
tive is to be achieved in at least three different ways. First, peace between European 
states is achieved through membership of the EU itself, intended to ensure that the 
peace in Europe of the last 50 years is sustained into the foreseeable future. Second, 
close and peaceful relations based on cooperation with neighbouring countries 
are promoted through special relations with the Union’s neighbours (article 7a-1). 
Third, peace and international security are generally promoted through the EU’s 
external actions, including the provisions on the Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP) such as ‘joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue 
tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping 
tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and 
post-conflict stabilisation’ (articles 27-1 and 28-1).
Social freedom
The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal 
frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appro-
priate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the 
prevention and combating of crime.16
The second EU normative principle is social freedom. Freedom in the EU operates 
within a distinctive socio-legal context. Thus, freedom is always just one of several 
rights, held alongside other equally important principles such as democracy, 
human rights and the rule of law. Within the EU social freedom is circumscribed 
by the need to ensure that other normative principles are not compromised by 
 unwarranted freedoms, such as anti-social behaviour, hate crimes, inflammatory 
speech or pornography. The wider implications of EU social freedom are signifi-
cant, not least in references to ‘protection of children’s rights’ as a foreign policy 
objective, as EU extraterritorial legislation on ‘sex tourism’ illustrates.
As the extract from the Reform Treaty illustrates, the second objective of 
the Union is to offer its citizens freedom (article 3-2). However, the rest of the 
treaty sets out the extent to which the promotion of freedom goes beyond the 
bounds of the area of freedom, security and justice. First, the five freedoms of 
persons, goods, services, capital and establishment are promoted within the EU 
(articles 39–60, Functioning Treaty). Second, freer trade and market access are 
promoted through trade liberalization agreements with partner countries in the 
form of the European Economic Area, customs unions, association agreements, 
15 Sonia Lucarelli and Roberto Menotti, ‘The use of force as coercive intervention: the conflicting values of 
the European Union’s external action’, in Lucarelli and Manners, Values and principles, pp. 147–63; Michael 
 Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaitė, European Union peacebuilding and policing (London: Routledge, 2006).
16 Article 3–2, Reform Treaty 2007.
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stabilization and association agreements, partnership and cooperation agreements, 
and economic partnership agreements. Third, fundamental freedoms such as 
freedom of thought, expression, assembly and association are promoted through 
the 14 articles of the freedom title of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and EU 
 accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (article 6, Reform Treaty 2007).
Consensual democracy
The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high 
degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to … consolidate and 
support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law.17
The third EU normative principle is consensual democracy. Consensual democracy 
is the operating principle within the majority of EU member states and includes 
proportional representation (PR) electoral systems, coalition governments and 
power-sharing among parties. Similarly, the EU itself is a consensual form of 
polity, with PR and power-sharing in the European Parliament, non-majoritarian 
voting (either qualified majority voting or unanimity) in the Council, and power-
sharing among all the member states. The EU has helped to spread consensual 
democracy into Central and Eastern Europe as part of the transition and accession 
processes.18
The trinity of democracy, human rights and rule of law, as article 10a of the 
Reform Treaty suggests, is to be consolidated and supported in the EU’s external 
action. The treaty indicates at least three ways in which democracy is to be 
promoted: first, internally, through the provisions on democratic principles set 
out in article 8, including democratic equality, representative and participatory 
democracy, and the role of national parliaments; second, through the solidarity 
clause, which the EU and its member states can invoke to protect democratic insti-
tutions from any terrorist attack (article 188r-a); and third, through enlargement 
and accession, as well as neighbourhood and development policies.
Associative human rights
The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). Such accession shall not affect the Union’s 
com petences as defined in the Treaties.19
Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional tradi-
tions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union’s 
law.20
17 Article 10a-2(b), Reform Treaty 2007.
18 Rosa Balfour, ‘Principles of democracy and human rights: a review of the European Union’s strategies towards 
its neighbours’, in Lucarelli and Manners, Values and principle, pp. 114–29.
19 Article 6–2, Reform Treaty 2007.
20 Article 6–3, Reform Treaty 2007.
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The fourth EU normative principle is associative human rights. Associative 
human rights include both individual human rights and collective human rights. 
These are associative because they emphasize the interdependence between 
individual rights, such as freedom of expression, and group rights, such as religion 
or belief. The associative nature of EU human rights has developed since the 1973 
Declaration on European Identity through the 1986 Declaration of Foreign Minis-
ters of the Community on Human Rights and the 1991 Resolution of the Council 
on Human Rights, Democracy and Development.21 All of these documents 
emphasize the universality and indivisibility of these associative human rights 
with consensual democracy, the supranational rule of law and social solidarity.
The article of the Reform Treaty dealing with fundamental rights, article 
6, illustrates the way in which human rights developments within the Union 
contribute to its external actions. The first aspect of this is the inclusion of human 
rights as general principles of the Union’s law, emphasized by the Charter and 
the planned accession to the ECHR. The second aspect is the extent to which the 
five articles in the dignity title of the Charter both reflect and are reflected in the 
promotion of human rights. The third aspect is the extent to which human rights 
provisions are promoted through the interdependent external actions of trade and 
aid, humanitarian and migration issues.
Supranational rule of law
The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, 
and international, regional or global organisations which share the principles referred to 
in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in 
particular in the framework of the United Nations.22
The fifth EU normative principle is the supranational rule of law.23 The EU 
principle of the rule of law is supranational in three senses—communitarian, 
international and cosmopolitan. First, the EU principle of communitarian law 
promotes the pooling of sovereignty through the acquis communautaire—the supra-
national rule of law within the EU. Second, the EU principle of international 
law encourages participation by the EU and its member states in supranational 
law above and beyond the EU.24 Third, the EU principle of cosmopolitan law 
advances the development and participation of the EU and its member states in 
humanitarian law and rights applicable to individuals.25
As the extract from the Reform Treaty illustrates, one element of the general 
provisions of the Union’s external action is to promote multilateral solutions to 
21 Elena Jurada, ‘Assigning duties in the global system of human rights: the role of the European Union’, in Hart-
mut Meyer and Henri Vogt, eds, A responsible Europe? The ethical foundation of EU external affairs (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
22 Article10a-1, Reform Treaty 2007.
23 From the perspective of member states, the promotion of the rule of law has come to be viewed as the ‘first 
among equals’ in the post-2003 era of ‘effective multilateralism’. My thanks to Elizabeth Burdett for this 
point.
24 Manners and Whitman, ‘The “difference engine”’, p. 399.
25 Manners, ‘Normative power Europe’ (JCMS), p. 241.
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common problems, in particular through the development of the supranational 
rule of law (article 10a-1). As the third part of the trinity the EU seeks to promote, 
the rule of law joins democracy and human rights as an essential element in EU 
agreements with third countries (article 10a-2b). Alongside freedoms, dignity and 
citizens’ rights, the four articles in the justice title of the Charter both reflect and 
are reflected in the promotion of the rule of law. The promotion of the rule of law 
both within and between states is part of the EU’s declared commitment to ‘effec-
tive multilateralism’ involving ‘well functioning international institutions and a 
rule-based international order’:26
Sometimes voluntarily, sometimes through gritted teeth and sometimes without even 
knowing, countries around the world are importing the EU’s rules … They all know 
that Brussels is slowly but steadily emerging as the regulatory capital of the world. As 
much as some loathe it, it is a trend that business leaders and policymakers from Tokyo to 
Washington feel they cannot afford to ignore.27
Inclusive equality
It shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and 
protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protec-
tion of the rights of the child.28
The sixth EU normative principle is inclusive equality, involving a more open-
ended and uninhibited understanding of which groups are particularly subject 
to discrimination than article 3-3 suggests.29 Hence, the 2000 Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the Union included references to the prohibition of ‘any discrimi-
nation based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic 
features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership 
of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation’ (article 
21, emphasis added). One weakness with the implementation of this principle is 
the extent to which discrimination based on nationality is still widespread in a 
majority of member states. This is particularly true of employment practices in 
consensual societies that promote homosociality.30
The third objective of the Union involves combating discrimination and 
promoting equality, as illustrated by article 3-2 of the Reform Treaty. The promo-
tion of equality in Europe and the world has at least three dimensions empha-
sizing the equality of citizens and member states, as well as identifying the types of 
discrimination to be targeted by its policies. First, the treaty identifies the principle 
26 Commission of the European Communities, ‘The European Union and the United Nations: the choice 
of multilateralism’, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 
COM(2003) 526 final (Brussels, 10 Sept. 2003), p. 3; Javier Solana, ‘A secure Europe in a better world: the 
European Security Strategy’, approved by the European Council 12 Dec. 2003, p. 9.
27 Tobias Buck, ‘Standard bearer: how the European Union exports its laws’, Financial Times, 10 July 2007, p. 9.
28 Article 3-3, Reform Treaty 2007.
29 Andrea Pető and Ian Manners, ‘The European Union and the value of gender equality’, in Lucarelli and 
Manners, Values and principles, pp. 97–113.
30 Michael Roper, ‘Seduction and succession: circuits of homosocial desire in management’, in David Collinson 
and Jeff Hearn, eds, Men as managers, managers as men (London: Sage, 1996), pp. 210–26.
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of equality of its citizens as being a fundamental democratic principle (article 8) 
and recognizes the equality of its member states as being a fundamental principle 
of union (article 4). Second, as discussed above, the treaty and Charter identify 
particularly common forms of discrimination to be combated, with a particular 
emphasis on gender equality across EU policies. Third, the seven articles in the 
equality title of the Charter emphasize the promotion of equality with atten-
tion to cultural diversity, gender, the rights of the child and the elderly, and the 
integration of persons with disabilities.
Social solidarity
The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development 
of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive 
social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of 
protection and improvement of the quality of the environment.31
The seventh EU normative principle is social solidarity. The extensive under-
standing of social solidarity becomes clear in references in the objectives of the 
draft Reform Treaty to ‘balanced economic growth’, ‘social market economy’, ‘full 
employment’ and combating ‘social exclusion’, as well as promoting ‘social justice 
and protection’, intergenerational solidarity, and social solidarity among (and 
between) member states. The principle of social solidarity goes beyond intra-EU 
relations to inform and shape EU development and trade policies, as the draft treaty 
suggests with its references to the Union’s contribution to ‘solidarity and mutual 
respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty’.32
In addition to promoting equality, the third objective of the Reform Treaty is 
to promote social solidarity through a variety of treaty areas, including intergen-
erational solidarity, interstate solidarity and labour solidarity. Intergenerational 
solidarity emphasizes the role of families and the state in providing practical, 
financial and social support across the generations. Interstate solidarity involves a 
spirit of mutual solidarity between member states in order to promote economic, 
social and territorial cohesion, as well as in response to terrorist attack or natural 
or human-induced disaster (articles 3-3 and 188r-1 in particular). Labour solidarity 
is concerned with the promotion of labour rights and protection, including core 
labour standards and fair trade, and can be found entrenched in the twelve articles 
in the solidarity title of the Charter, as well as in the reference to ‘free and fair 
trade’ in article 3-5 of the Reform Treaty.
Sustainable development
The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high 
degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to … help develop 
international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the 
31 Article 3-3, Reform Treaty 2007.
32 See Federico Bonaglia, Andrea Goldstein and Fabio Petito, ‘Values in European Union development coopera-
tion policy’, in Lucarelli and Manners, Values and principles, pp. 164–84.
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sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable devel-
opment.33
The eighth EU normative principle is sustainable development, which places an 
emphasis on the dual problems of balance and integration. The EU principle of 
sustainable development is intended to provide a balance between uninhibited 
economic growth and biocentric ecological crisis: the Union ‘seeks to promote 
balanced and sustainable development’ (preamble to the Charter) and ‘shall 
work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic 
growth’ (article 3-3). In parallel, the principle also involves the integration, or 
mainstreaming, of sustainable development into the policies and activities of the 
Union.34 The EU seeks to promote these principles of sustainable development 
beyond Europe through its enlargement, development, trade, environmental and 
foreign policies.
As article 10a-2f of the Reform Treaty illustrates, the Union promotes sustain-
able development through encouraging international environmental protection 
and the sustainable management of global natural resources. As discussed, this 
first involves balancing internal economic growth with protecting and improving 
the quality of the environment (article 3-3). Second, such promotion involves the 
relatively unusual Charter article integrating environmental protection into the 
policies of the Union in accordance with the principle of sustainable development. 
Third, the Union’s promotion of sustainable development extends to fostering 
‘the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing 
countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty’ (article 10a-2d).
Good governance
The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high 
degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to … promote an 
international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global gover-
nance.35
The ninth EU normative principle is good governance, emphasizing quality, 
representation, participation, social partnership, transparency and accountability 
in ‘the democratic life of the Union’ (Reform Treaty). The EU principle of good 
governance has two distinctive elements, both of which have significant internal 
and external consequences: namely, the participation of civil society and the 
strengthening of multilateral cooperation. Since the Commission presidency of 
Romano Prodi (1999–2004) significant emphasis has been placed on the promotion 
of good governance through the participation of civil society in order to encourage 
openness and transparency, as well as to facilitate democratic participation (articles 
21a and 8b). In parallel, the unilaterally led invasion of Iraq has ensured that member 
33 Article 10a-2f, Reform Treaty 2007.
34 Susan Baker, ‘Environmental values and climate change policy: contrasting the European Union and the 
United States’, in Lucarelli and Manners, Values and principles, pp. 77–96.
35 Article 10a-2h, Reform Treaty 2007.
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states have strengthened their commitments to the promotion of ‘an international 
system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance’, as 
the extract from the Reform Treaty illustrates.36 The treaty also suggests that the 
promotion of good governance is to be achieved through as least three different 
practices involving participatory democracy, openness and transparency; multilat-
eralism; and good global governance (see articles 8b, 10a, 21a, and the right to good 
administration in the citizen’s rights title of the Charter).
Procedural normative ethics 
Over the years we have accomplished a great deal together. The single market, the euro and 
enlargement, which has been a tremendous success in spreading democracy and prosperity 
across our continent. We do system change, not regime change. We do it slowly and on a 
basis of partnership.37
As a second step towards assessing whether the EU engages in normative practices, 
I will look at the way different approaches to normative ethics help us make sense 
of normative power. As the extract from Javier Solana’s speech suggests, it is not 
just substantive normative principles such as democracy that are important, but the 
way in which the EU promotes such principles—here described as ‘slowly and on 
a basis of partnership’.
The study of normative ethics involves asking what principles and practices are 
considered important, by whom and why. Normative ethics focuses on the impact 
these beliefs have on actions taken by groups and societies in order to understand 
which actions are considered right or wrong. In this respect it is usual to distin-
guish three approaches to normative ethics—virtue ethics, deontological ethics 
and consequentialist ethics—each of which I shall briefly consider within the 
context of my discussion of EU normative ethics. Here I use an original tripar-
tite analytical method based on bringing the EU’s principles, actions and impact 
together with three approaches to normative ethics in order to help us make sense 
of, and judge, the EU’s normative power in world politics.
EU principles and virtue ethics
The first part of the tripartite analysis is to examine the constitutive principles 
of the EU and how these become promoted as aims and objectives of the EU 
in world politics. As discussed in the previous section, the EU’s nine substantive 
prin ciples are being constitutionalized as principles and objectives of external 
action,  regardless of the ratification of the Reform Treaty. One path to judging the 
EU’s principles is through reference to wider discussions of neo-Aristotelian virtue 
ethics in philosophy: ‘Virtue ethics is currently one of the three major approaches 
in normative ethics. It may, initially, be identified as the one that emphasizes the 
36 See Adrian van den Hoven, ‘European Union regulatory capitalism and multilateral trade negotiations’, in 
Lucarelli and Manners, Values and principles, pp. 185–200.
37 Javier Solana, ‘Europe’s answers to the global challenges’, speech to the University of Copenhagen, 8 Sept. 
2006.
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virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach which emphasizes duties 
or rules (deontology) or that which emphasizes the consequences of actions.’38 
Virtue ethicists such as Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse draw on Aristotle’s 
notion of virtue in terms of character traits or dispositions.39 This tends to put the 
emphasis on teaching and education as part of the social and personal develop-
ment of moral virtue. In terms of thinking about normative power, virtue ethics 
encourages us to look at the character or traits which guide the EU and its member 
states in their pursuit of external actions.
Virtue ethics and its emphasis on the moral character of social groups encourage 
a focus on the interpretation of virtues such as ‘benevolence’, ‘generosity’ or 
‘justice’. Such an interrogation inevitably involves examining the means through 
which such virtues become established and the extent to which a group shares 
them. The establishment of virtues through education, religion or other social 
practices clearly forms an important part of understanding the shared basis of the 
common good. General examples of such virtues might include classical merits 
such as temperance, prudence, fortitude or justice. More religious virtues such 
as faith and charity entered the catalogue of valued qualities at a later stage. It 
is also worth considering the way in which derivations of such virtues entered 
the discourses of European Enlightenment in modern times. Hence the French 
Revolution championed the virtues of liberty, equality and ‘fraternity’ (solidarity), 
while the EU seeks the virtues of unity and diversity.
Drawing on the discussion of virtue ethics, it might be suggested that any EU 
normative ethic should be based on ‘living by virtuous example’.40 ‘Living by 
example’ involves ensuring that the EU is both normatively coherent and consis-
tent in its policies. Coherence entails ensuring that the EU is not simply promoting 
its own norms, but that the normative principles that constitute it and its external 
actions are part of a more universalizable and holistic strategy for world peace. 
Here references to the UN’s Charter, Bill of Rights and additional protocols 
become important as all nine substantive normative principles can be found in these 
instruments of the UN system (including the International Labour Office and the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change).41 Consistency means ensuring that 
the EU is not hypocritical in promoting norms which it does itself not comply 
with; as Kalypso Nicolaïdis and Dimitri Nicolaïdis have put it, ‘Fundamentally, 
normative power can only be applied credibly under a key condition: consistency 
between internal policies and external prescriptions and actions.’42
38 Rosalind Hursthouse, ‘Virtue ethics’, Stanford encyclopaedia of philosophy, 18 July 2003, p. 3, http://plato.stanford.
edu/entries/ethics-virtue/, accessed 13 August 2007.
39 Philippa Foot, Virtues and vices and other essays in moral philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978); Rosalind Hurst-
house, On virtue ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
40 See David Coombes, ‘Leading by virtuous example: European policy for overseas development’, in Bill 
McSweeney, ed., Moral issues in international affairs: problems of European integration (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1998), pp. 221–45.
41 See discussions in Manners, ‘Normative power Europe’ (JCMS), p. 241; Manners, ‘A response to Thomas 
Diez’, pp. 170–3.
42 Kalypso Nicolaïdis and Dimitri Nicolaïdis, ‘The EuroMed beyond civilisational paradigms’, in Emanuel Adler, 
Federica Bicchi, Beverly Crawford and Raffaella Del Sarto, eds, The convergence of civilisations: constructing a 
Mediterranean region (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), pp. 348–9.
INTA84_1_02_Manners.indd   76 10/12/07   16:27:31
The normative ethics of the European Union
77
International Affairs 84: 1, 2008
© 2008 The Author(s). Journal Compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd/The Royal Institute of International Affairs
EU actions and deontological ethics
[W]e rely on moral persuasion, the power of argument, and the power of shaming … 
Other factors in these circumstances of voluntary compliance are also important, such as 
the domestic salience of the norm, its legitimacy and coherence, and the extent to which it 
fits with other prevailing and well-established standards; but norms are expressed through 
language and the process of argumentation and debate can shape what is said subsequently 
in both domestic and international venues.43
The second part of the tripartite analysis is to look at how the EU promotes its 
constitutive principles as actions and policies in world politics. As Rosemary Foot 
suggests, in its most general form normative power relies more on persuasion, 
argument and shaming than on illegitimate force to shape world politics. Building 
on the virtue ethics of coherence and consistency, such normative actions rely on 
engagement and dialogue as the means of external action. A path to judging the 
EU’s actions is through reference to wider discussions of neo-Kantian deonto-
logical ethics in philosophy:
The central thought of Kant’s account of public reason is that the standards of reason 
cannot be derivative. Any appeal to other, external authorities to buttress our reasoning 
must fail. Just as a learner cyclist who clutches at passing objects and leans on them for 
balance thereby fails to balance at all, so a would-be reasoner who leans on some socially or 
civilly constituted power or authority which lacks reasoned vindication fails to reason.44
Deontological ethicists such as Onora O’Neill draw on Immanuel Kant’s notion 
of public reason in terms of duties and rules governing action.45 As the passage 
quoted above illustrates, a deontological approach involves reasoning the merits of 
action without reference to, or derivation from, an external authority. In contrast 
to virtue ethics, a deontological approach to normative power emphasizes the 
rationalization of duties and rules which guide the EU in its external actions.
Deontological ethics moves the focus beyond the character of social groups 
towards an understanding of group actions and inactions. O’Neill and other 
neo-Kantians seek to emphasize the progressive and expansive role of public 
debate and reasoning in creating the rights and duties held to be important within 
a group. An awareness of the promotion of such rule-governed behaviour through 
domestic and international law is central to making sense of this shared idea of the 
common good. Unlike virtue ethics, deontological ethics provides few absolute 
merits which might be pursued; rather, the approach emphasizes the means 
through which actions are motivated and practised. In this respect, much weight is 
placed on the establishment of law, including both rights and duties, in the pursuit 
of the common good. Both supporters and detractors of the EU have argued that it 
has become a ‘Kantian paradise’ governed by domestic and international law such 
as the acquis communautaire.46
43 Rosemary Foot, Rights beyond borders: the global community and the struggle over human rights in China (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 9.
44 Onora O’Neill, ‘Bounded and cosmopolitan justice’, Review of International Studies 26, 2000, p. 52.
45 Onora O’Neill, Bounds of justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Hans Reiss, Kant: political 
writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
46 Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, ‘Looking to Europe: American perceptions of the Old World’, Cooperation and Conflict 
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Going beyond virtue ethics and drawing instead on the discussion of deonto-
logical ethics, it could be argued that any EU normative ethics should based on 
‘being reasonable’ in world politics. ‘Being reasonable’ involves ensuring that 
the EU reasons and rationalizes its external actions through processes of engage-
ment and dialogue. Engagement entails initiating and institutionalizing regular 
and transparent patterns of communication or partnership, for example through 
accession procedures, stabilization and/or association agreements, the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, African, Caribbean and Pacific relations, and Generalized 
System of Preferences ‘Plus’ arrangements. Dialogue means engaging in two-way 
deliberation and discussion as part of reasoning the merits of external actions, for 
example through association councils and the negotiation of action plans. Both 
engagement and dialogue provide a means for reasoning with others implicated 
in EU external actions, whether members, partners or targets through persuasion, 
argument or shaming.
EU impact and consequentialist ethics
The third part of the tripartite analysis is to consider the impact and outcomes of 
EU actions taken to promote its constitutive principles in world politics. Whereas 
analysis of principles and actions focuses on the origins and practices of EU external 
actions, an emphasis on impact requires wider reading of the way in which policies 
change and shape the partners and targets of such actions. A final path to judging 
the EU’s impact is through reference to wider discussions of neo-utilitarian conse-
quentialist ethics in philosophy:
It is a necessary feature of consequentialism that it is a shallow philosophy. For there are 
always borderline cases in ethics. Now if you are an Aristotelian … you will deal with a 
borderline case by considering whether doing such-and-such in such-and-such circum-
stances is, say, murder, or an act of injustice; and accordingly you decide it is or it isn’t, 
you judge it to be a thing to do or not … The consequentialist has no footing on which 
to say ‘this would be permissible, this not’; because by [their] own hypothesis, it is the 
consequences that are to decide.47
Consequentialist ethicists such as Elizabeth Anscombe draw on and develop 
the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill in order to argue 
for  normative ethics based on the outcomes of actions.48 In contrast to the 
neo-Aristotelian or neo-Kantian approaches, Anscombe argued that a consequen-
tialist approach did not judge ethical cases on their own merit, but looked towards 
the consequences of action or inaction for guidance. Unlike virtue and deonto-
logical ethics, which focus on motivations, theorizing normative power using a 
 consequentialist approach involves analysing the impacts of EU actions and their 
implications for others.
39: 1, 2004, pp. 71–3; Anand Menon, Kalypso Nicolaïdis and Jennifer Walsh, ‘In defence of Europe: a response 
to Kagan’, Journal of European Affairs 2: 3, 2004, p. 9.
47 Elizabeth Anscombe, ‘Modern moral philosophy’, Philosophy: the Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy 33: 
124, 1958.
48 Mary Geach and Luke Gormally, eds, Human life, action and ethics: essays by G. E. M. Anscombe (Exeter: Imprint 
Academic, 2006); Stephen Darwall, ed., Consequentialism (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002).
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Although consequentialist ethics shares an emphasis with deontological ethics 
on the rights and wrongs of group actions, the focus of this approach is on the 
interplay between actors and consequences. The implications of this approach are 
significant for debates regarding the relationships between the EU and the rest of 
the world, for example raising questions about the merits of EU aid and trade. 
This also introduces the problem of value pluralism and the extent to which the 
merits of differing consequences may themselves be moral choices.49 This problem 
has become widespread in debates regarding the relative merits of pursuing simul-
taneously the sustainable development agenda propounded in 1992 at Rio and in 
2002 at Johannesburg, the 2000 UN Millennium Development Goals, the 2001 
Doha Declaration and the 2002 Monterrey Consensus, with their very different 
consequences.50
Consequentialist ethics leads to the suggestion that the EU should ‘do least 
harm’ in world politics. ‘Doing least harm’ involves ensuring that the EU thinks 
reflexively about the impact of its policies on partner countries and regions, in 
particular through encouraging local ownership and practising positive condition-
ality. Local ownership is crucial in ensuring that relationships are ‘other empow-
ering’, in contrast to the self-empowering actions of much foreign, development 
and humanitarian policy. Positive conditionality is also a factor in assessing 
whether the EU is ‘doing least harm’ in the places it is trying to act by ensuring 
that ‘progress is rewarded with greater incentives and benefits [and] an even deeper 
relationship’.51
Conclusion: a more just, cosmopolitical world
In terms of normative power, I broadly agree: we are one of the most important, if not 
the most important, normative powers in the world. Look, for instance, even beyond this 
case that he talks about: the death penalty … Even foreign policy. Yes, it gets the media’s 
attention when we are divided. But most member states of the EU vote the same way in 
the United Nations. The pattern is impressive. There is not any group of countries in the 
world that have the same degree of homogeneity … Why is that? It is because we have 
been successful in establishing norms, and applying them to different realities … It is in 
fact the EU that sets the standards for others much of the time.52
I have attempted to suggest that normative ethics provides us with a means of 
assessing whether the EU is acting as a normative power in world politics. I have 
further suggested that we can ask some pretty difficult questions about EU relations 
with the world by deploying a tripartite analytical method based on judging its 
principles, actions and impact. The final step is to apply this  framework to a series of 
49 Soran Reader, ‘New directions in ethics: naturalisms, reasons and virtue’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 3, 
2000, p. 356.
50 Manners, ‘European Union “normative power” and the security challenge’, pp. 412–16.
51 Benita Ferrero-Waldner, ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy: the EU’s newest foreign policy instrument’, 
European Foreign Affairs Review 11, 2006, p. 140.
52 John Peterson, ‘José Manuel Barroso = political scientist: John Peterson interviews the European Commission 
President’, 17 July 2007, pp. 4–5, complete transcript, EU-Consent: Constructing Europe Network, http://
www.eu-consent.net/library/BARROSO-transcript.pdf, accessed 13 Aug. 2007.
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case-studies representing a broad cross-section of EU external actions by comparing 
and contrasting these three analytical parts. Such a comparative analysis is likely 
to raise questions about the relative importance of principles, actions and impact 
in some of the EU’s most difficult policies with the rest of the world, including 
those with the ‘axis of ego’ (United States, China, Russia); with difficult regimes 
(e.g. Belarus, Burma, Iran, Zimbabwe); with transnational actors (e.g. transna-
tional capital/companies, Wahhabi jihadists); and in conflict regions (e.g. Somalia, 
Congo, Sudan, Afghanistan, Iraq).
As José Manuel Barroso argued when asked to comment on my normative 
power approach, the EU might be one of the most important normative powers in 
the world because of its ability to establish normative principles and apply them to 
different realities. It is this application of normative principles to different realities 
that is central to the EU’s normative ethics—it should ‘live by example’, ‘be reason-
able’ and ‘do least harm’ whether it is acting alone or in partnership, whether its 
partners are in Europe or the Pacific, and whether it is dealing with global warming 
or counterterrorism. Ultimately, as Javier Solana’s comments quoted above suggest, 
it may be simply too early even to contemplate the extremely long-term vision of 
an EU that is a normative power: system change from Westphalian self-regarding 
to post-Westphalian other-regarding is slow and needs partners. In this respect the 
long-term diffusion of ideas in a normatively sustainable way works like water on 
stone, not like napalm in the morning.
I am becoming more and more convinced that a foreign policy which is based solely on 
interests, whether on a national or a regional perception thereof, is no longer sustainable. 
In my view Europe needs a foreign policy firmly anchored in ethics, and based on univer-
sally accepted values and principles. What we need are transparent political choices that 
can be explained to our national parliaments, public and media.53
The creative efforts and longer-term vision of EU normative power towards 
the achievement of a more just, cosmopolitical world which empowers people 
in the actual conditions of their lives should and must be based on more univer-
sally accepted values and principles that can be explained to both Europeans and 
non-European alike. In this respect I share the commitment of former Commis-
sioner Emma Bonino to ensuring that the EU’s relations with the rest of the world 
are based on more transparent normative ethics that accommodate the social 
rights and perceptions of the member states with those of the EU and its citizens, 
together with the universal individual rights of non-Europeans, no matter where 
one might live.
 53 Emma Bonino, ‘Principled aid in an unprincipled world’, speech delivered to ECHO/Overseas Development 
Institute (ODI) Conference by European Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs, speech/98/69, 7 April 
1998.
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